Is there a trade-o between people's preference for income equality and income mobility? Testing for the existence of such a trade-o is dicult because mobility is a multifaceted concept. We analyse results from a questionnaire experiment based on simple precise concepts of income inequality and income mobility. We nd no direct trade-o in preference between mobility and equality, but an indirect trade-o, applying when more income mobility can only be obtained at the expense of some income inequality. Mobility preference but not equality preference appears to be driven by personal experience of mobility.
Introduction
Do people value income mobility along with other apparently desirable economic objectives? In contrast to the extensive literature on simple distributional comparisons in connection with inequality, poverty and social welfare, the welfare-economic basis underlying preferences for income mobility is not clear. It may be that there is a connection between mobility and equality of opportunity and that greater income mobility is thus socially desirable, but there is no single accepted formal argument to establish this. Nevertheless there is, perhaps, an accepted consensus that greater mobility in society is a good thing and so it makes sense to see whether people do indeed value this good thing in the way that we suppose that they do. The contribution of this paper is to suggest a way of characterising a trade-o between mobility and other apparently desirable social objectives and of looking at the factors which may predispose people to value mobility particularly highly.
Income mobility is a topic that crosses disciplines which partly explains the diculty of nding a way of appraising a unique formal notion of mobility ( Van de gaer et al. 2001 , Formby et al. 2004 . While sociologists and statisticians are especially interested in measuring mobility in the abstract, 1 economists are often interested in judging and evaluating income mobility from a welfare-based perspective. In the theoretical literature this is done either using explicit welfare functions or axiomatic approaches.
2 Our analysis has both normative and empirical content: it is based on a questionnaire study and is rooted in empirical social choice.
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Its premise is that in the debates about principles of social justice it is important to engage with the way people actually think, both in order to avoid becoming hostage of scientic conventions and because it is real people who bear the consequences of decisions based on untested normative principles. 4 1 See for example Prais (1955) , Rogo (1953) , Duncan (1966) , Goldthorpe (1980) , Conlisk (1990) .
2 For welfare approaches see Atkinson (1981) , Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) ; Chakravarty et al. (1985) , Dardanoni (1993) , Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002), Markandya (1982) ; for axiomatic approaches see Shorrocks (1978) , Cowell (1985) , Cowell and Flachaire (2011) , Fields and Ok (1996) , Mitra and Ok 1998, D'Agostino and Dardanoni (2009). 3 See Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) , the seminal articles by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) , Amiel and Cowell (1992) and the overviews in Amiel (1999) and Konow (2003) .
4 What matters in the questionnaire studies are people's ethical values, and not their behaviour determined by personal and strategic evaluations. The absence of strategic and
personal motivations is what characterises the questionnaire method from the experimental approach, also recently applied with dierent objectives to questions related to distributive justice see Krawczyk (2010) , Cappelen et al. (2010) , for issues related to those treated here. The two approaches are complementary.
mobility? We suggest that it is appropriate to try to nd a context-free way of representing the problem similar to the way that is done when making inequality or welfare comparisons using principles of distributional dominance.
However, we need to go carefully here because, although multidimensional versions of dominance principles are available, it is not clear that these formal results are particularly illuminating in terms of what is commonly understood by income mobility. Furthermore, if we want to understand whether people value mobility it is useful to have a representation of the problem that allows both for clear mobility comparisons and for a trade-o against some other social goal. In our questionnaire we focus on intergenerational income mobility and we suggest a method of investigating a possible trade-o between mobility and equality in people's preferences.
Intergenerational mobility is also a central issue in distributive justice debates: how should one account for accidents of birth when seeking a just distribution of nal outcomes? Some argue that only income inequalities
arising from dierences at birth should be a cause for concern. In our approach we contrast the liberal position that all forms of income dierences are equally unjustied unless they go the advantage of the least well-o people and also with intermediate positions. We identify meritocratic views that allow income inequality to the extent that it serves the purpose of rewarding talent or desert: this position does not necessarily imply an ethical substitution between income mobility and income equality.
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There is also a recent wave of empirical studies that analyse the way preferences for policies that equalize incomes are aected by factors related to mobility 6 and that are associated with the theoretical approaches in Hirschman (1973), Piketty (1995) , Benabou and Ok (2001) . This literature typically nds that support for an equalization of income expressed in social surveys is aected by belief in one's own prospects of upwards mobility and by trust in factors which are generally thought to promote mobility. However, the results are not so useful in understanding the values which individuals place on mobility and on equality per se. So part of our analysis focuses on the possible eect of respondents' personal characteristics on their abstract preferences for mobility and for equality.
5 Underlying the liberal position is the view that identies income mobility with equality of opportunity (Stokey 1998, p.161) . However equality of opportunity has a variety of interpretations: it is used in the egalitarian literature to describe a situation of procedural equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971) or to represent the ideal of an egalitarianism tempered by responsibility (Dworkin 1981 , Roemer 1998 6 See for example, Fong (2001) , Corneo and Grüner (2002) , Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) , Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) .
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the main theoretical ideas analysed in the questionnaire. Section 3 explains the approach adopted to elicit people's views and perceptions of mobility and describes the samples used for our study. Sections 4 and 5 examine the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Welfare economics, income distribution and mobility Our approach involves hypothetical questions and judgments expressed from the standpoint of an uninvolved external observer. 7 Using hypothetical questions without personal involvement encourages coherent thinking about social mobility comparisons in the abstract, which by their multidimensional nature are intrinsically more problematic than pure inequality comparisons.
Take a standard framework in which there are n dynasties in society, each of which is present for one of two periods: the parent of dynasty i is alive in period 0 and the child of dynasty i in period 1. The whole structure of the society can be represented by the joint distribution H(P, C) of the pair of random variables P and C for, respectively, parents' and children's incomes. In particular, the joint distribution H(P, C) contains all the relevant information to study inequality within each generation, mobility between generations and the interplay between the two.
Assume that within each generation income can take only two values: P l and P h for parents' low and high incomes, respectively; C l and C h for children's incomes. The joint distribution for this simple case can then be represented by the 2 × 2 mobility table in Figure 1 . 8 Here n ij denotes the number of dynasties with parents belonging to category i and children to category j, with i j n ij = n and i, j = l, h. Dividing n ij by n gives the relative frequency of children in class j with parents in class i, an estimate of the probability of transition from class i to class j. The row and column sums n i . and n. j give the absolute frequencies of the marginal distributions of parents' and children's incomes, respectively.
The marginal distributions of parents and children provide information of a static nature: they represent the basis for analysing inequality and welfare within generations. Take Figure 2 where parents have the same marginal 7 This is consistent with David Hume and Adam Smith who argued that the sympathy and impartiality required to discuss distributive justice can only be obtained by putting some distance between the social decision maker and the persons whose welfare is to be evaluated (Bernasconi 2002 , Bosmans and Schokkaert 2004 , Amiel et al. 2009 8 This representation of a mobility table enables the marginal distributions to be seen easily.
Children's margins n. l = n ll + n hl n. h = n lh + n hh In analysing a mobility table one has to consider two forms of interdependence occurring between the distributions P and C: structural mobility refers to the comparison between parents' and children's marginal distributions of incomes and is aected by the process of economic growth;
9 exchange mobility is only concerned with the process of class transition, namely the degree to which parents and children change their relative positions between income classes. The importance of keeping separate these two notions of mobility has been extensively documented (Rogo 1953 , Duncan 1966 , Goldthorpe 1980 but, from a normative welfare perspective, the distinction between structural and exchange mobility is more problematic. In particular, while the distinction between the two is recognised conceptually (Markandya 1982) , it is dicult to decompose their eects in specic welfare measures (Fields and Ok 1999, p.565) . Welfare studies on intergenerational mobility typically focus on exchange mobility, while the eect of structural mobility has attracted less interest.
Here we limit the possible role of structural mobility on welfare judgments by comparing scenarios where marginal distributions can be dierent for at most a dierent amount of inequality in the children's generation (as between X and W, on the one side, and Y and Z, on the other). Moreover, we will consider scenarios which maintain the simple association structure of the above examples, namely with a symmetric conguration (that is, n ij = n ji for i = j) and where both generations of parents and children are divided evenly between rich and poor (n l . = n h . and n. l = n. h ).
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With the latter 9 For example, during an economic expansion, children experience an increase in the probability of obtaining a higher income than their parents; the opposite occurs during economic decline. The higher inequality of the children's marginal distributions in tables Y and Z may then be attributed to the dierent income growth rates of rich and poor families.
10 The two restrictions imply that the associated transition matrices have non-negative restrictions the strength of association between parents and children in a 2 × 2 mobility table can be measured directly by the mixing parameter m = 1 − n ii /n i . indicating the proportion of children which change their positions with respect to their parents. 11 In a rigid society such as Figure 
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A change in intergenerational income dependence can have two opposing eects on welfare: an increase in independence reduces inequality between dynasties, but it also increases intertemporal uctuations of incomes within dynasties (Atkinson 1981) . Extending the theory of stochastic dominance to a multidimensional context, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) have shown that in a dynamic welfare framework which considers only these two eects of mobility, the social optimum (for a mobility table with x marginal distributions) collapses either to a case of complete rigidity or to one with full reversal.
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An important limitation of this type of framework is that it does not recognize any special value to the case of full mixing (m = 0.5) although, from a welfare perspective, this case has been taken as an indicator of equality of opportunity (Shorrocks 1978 , Dardanoni 1993 , Gottschalk and Spolaore 2002 .
14 Although the relation between preferences for income mobilentries such that both rows and columns sum to unity.
11 While the parameter m and similar measures for the strength of intergenerational association in a mobility table are taken as measures of exchange mobility, they represent proper measures of the latter concept only when structural mobility is absent in cases in which the marginal distributions of parents and children in a mobility table are equal. This is rarely the case, which is also why is so dicult to separate the two concepts in welfare analyses.
12 Negative association, where 0.5 < m ≤ 1, is only of theoretical interest since real world mobility data never show complete reversal between parents and children's economic positions; see Dardanoni et al. (2012) who show that the hypothesis of nonnegative association cannot be rejected in almost all social mobility tables in 149 dierent countries and time periods.
13 For example, a framework falling in this category is the utilitarian welfare function:
Indeed, for this function Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) have shown that when ∂ 2 U (P i , P j )/∂P i ∂C j < (>)0, moving weight o (on) the diagonal of a transition matrix, equivalent to reducing (increasing) m in terms of our specication, is welfare improving.
14 For example, Shorrocks (1978) developed an axiomatic approach to mobility measurement where an axiom is explicitly introduced which assigns maximum value to transition matrices (a reduced form of mobility tables; see footnote 8) with the least amount of predictability . Dardanoni (1993) presents a model where children coming from parents in lower economic positions receive a higher weight in the social evaluation than those coming from better positioned families: as he restricts attention to tables with non-negative dependence, it follows that welfare is maximised, ceteris paribus, by mobility tables with ity and for income equality has not received great attention in the welfaremeasurement literature, within the general literature on distributive justice, the issue is a matter of lively debate. There are three main views:
1. The substitution view.
15 Origin independence should be the main objective of a just society and a concern for income inequality should only receive social concern if partial or complete rigidities cannot be fully 2. Priority for the worst o. Equality of opportunity and of outcome should be considered on dierent ethical grounds and the degree of static inequality in a society should always be kept at the minimum compatible with the maximum level of income for the least well-o people (Rawls 1971) . Under this approach, X is better than Y in Figure   2 and W is better than Z in Figure 3 .
3. Intermediate position. In a well-organized society talents should be promoted and this requires equality of opportunity. Often this idea is linked to the role of incentives for economic eciency (Loury 1981) , but in addition there may be fairness considerations that do not imply a substitution between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.
One may support the idea that rewards gained by individuals should be related to their individual desert; but also that income inequality should be accepted only to the extent it serves such a purpose.
Consider a comparison between X and Z, in addition to those between X and Y and between W and Z. According to the substitution view, together with X preferred to Y and Z to W, Z should also be preferred to X. On the other hand, any theory which values equality but not mobility implies X preferred to Y, W to Z, and X to Z. Someone who values both mobility and equality may instead prefer X to Y, W to Z, but Z to X. The latter preferences in particular signify that there may be an ethic which values both equality of origin independence. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) We use students as subjects for our questionnaire: they are used to working with numerical examples and to reasoning about logical propositions. There is also expectation that they are more open minded and less aected by prejudices than other categories of people.
Designing a questionnaire presents several challenges. If the questionnaire tasks are not clearly explained respondents may not answer or may give inaccurate answers. The same may happen if the questionnaire is uninteresting, too dicult or too long. A major problem for our design was also that of nding an intuitive way to translate the technical notion of mobility tables in terms of displays accessible to student respondents.
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The main part of the questionnaire consists of eight pair-wise comparisons designed to investigate whether mobility is considered a desirable social objective in the abstract. Each comparison presents a pair of scenarios A and B characterised by dierent income proles as in the examples discussed in the previous section; we use bus queue pictures (Amiel and Cowell 1999) to represent the two income groups within each generation of parents and children; dynasties are identied by colour see Figure 4 . 18 This combines 16 There are views that value neither equality nor mobility: according to Nozick (1974) , any inequality that has not been obtained by expropriation or exploitation can be justied.
The problem of nding an intuitive display to represent mobility scenarios in a questionnaire has been discussed by Bernasconi and Dardanoni (2004, 2005) .
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In the example scenario A corresponds to mobility 
3.1
The structure of the questionnaire Table 1 summarises the pair-wise comparisons of the questionnaire. For each scenario the two numbers in round brackets give the ratios between parents' and children's incomes for the group of poor and rich, respectively: so (2, 2)
means that both the poor group and the rich group double their incomes from the x parents' levels of $200 and $600, respectively. All the scenarios of the questionnaire are based either on (2, 2) or on (3, 1.67). Clearly, the scenarios using (2, 2) are characterised by a widening of the inequality between the 19 Impartial position means that the individual whose preferences are considered is not directly involved in the distributions of income in the society . This was explained in the introduction to the questionnaire, which also explained other features, including the fact that the questionnaire is about social preferences for the distributions of incomes in hypothetical societies of two generations, the generation of the parents and the generation of the children ; the fact there are dierent dimensions which may be involved in considering income distributions ; the way in which displays have to be looked at and interpreted. The full questionnaire is available at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/resources/questionnaires/MobilityQuestionnaireWelfare.pdf poor and the rich. The number in square brackets is the parameter m of Section 2: the higher is m the more mixing there is in society and the greater is the degree of intergenerational mobility. The the questionnaire uses three values for m: 50% (full mixing), 20% (partial mixing) and 0% (rigidity).
Comparing scenarios with dierent combinations of parameters can be used to draw inferences on the various principles and ideas discussed above.
Q1 shows two scenarios with the same inequality (no widening), but with mobility higher in A. Q4 and Q7 have a similar structure, but dierent values for the mixing parameter. Thus, the three questions can be used to investigate whether people value mobility as such, namely when mobility does not interfere with static inequality. The answers to the three questions will show whether more mobility induces stronger preference. In Q2, Q5 and Q8, mobility is the same in both scenarios, but there is widening in the B scenarios; mobility of the scenarios is higher moving from Q2, to Q5 and Q8. Therefore, the answers to each individual question can be used to infer people attitude towards static income inequality; whereas comparing the distributions of answers across questions will be used to investigate the substitution view: whether more mobility induces a lower support for income equality per se. Q3 and Q6 present scenarios where both mobility and inequality are dierent: in Q3, A is a scenario with rigidity and less inequality than in B, which is characterised by full mixing and widening; Q6 is similar (B has partial mixing). Comparing the distributions of answers between the two questions can provide evidence on people willingness to sacrice some income equality in order to obtain more income mobility, an idea that we have suggested may be consistent with an ethic of meritocracy. Evidence on the same notion can also be obtained comparing the answers to Q3 and Q6 with those in Q8, which compares two rigid scenarios and B has more inequality (widening). By contrast, persistent preferences for A in the three questions would be consistent with a strict egalitarianism.
The samples
The questionnaires were completed in 2009 and 2010 by a total of 356 university students. They were from the university of Venice (Italy), LSE (UK),
and Ruppin Academic Center (Israel): 120, 89 and 147 participants, respectively. All students were upper-level undergraduates, in most cases with main training in economics, but with no specic teaching in the theory of income mobility. Using as respondents students at about the similar stage in education but from dierent countries allows one to address the question of the impact of cultural background on perception and evaluation of mobility.
The questionnaire was administered during lectures or classes. Answering the full questionnaire required about 20 minutes.
Results
Here we present the preferences expressed by participants in the pair-wise comparisons, focusing on ve major issues. Table 2 reports the answers to the three questions as percentage of each country subsample and in the aggregate (ALL). The second column gives the number of valid responses for each question and in each country: there were very few non-responses. In all countries the majority of subjects report a preference for A in all three questions. A dierence-of-proportion tests (column d -test) conrms that the dierences are statistically signicant in all the comparisons. Therefore, we conclude that participants indeed value mobility in all the three countries. χ 2 -tests reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity in Q1
and Q4, while homogeneity is accepted in Q7. The results of the tests are , denote rejection at, 10%, 5%, and 1% signicance levels. consistent with the evidence that in Q1 and in Q4, there are higher proportions of choices for A, hence stronger preferences for mobility, in UK than in Israel and in Italy. This interesting piece of evidence will be examined in more detail studying the eect of personal factors.
2. Does more mobility elicit stronger preference? A second issue can be addressed by comparing the answers to Q1, Q4 and Q7: whether more mobility induces stronger preferences or whether preferences for mobility does not depend on the degree of mobility. In the former case, we should expect that the proportions of choice for A in Q1 are higher than in both Q4 and Q7.
We do not see any such systematic tendency: looking at simple percentages, A in Q1 is chosen more often than A in Q4 in Italy and Israel, but not in UK;
and it is chosen more often than A in Q7 in UK, but not in Italy nor Israel (where A is Q1 is chosen as often as in Q7). To obtain further evidence on the issue, Table 3 shows the bivariate distributions of preferences expressed by participants in (Q1,Q4) and (Q1,Q7). Since we did not nd any signicant dierence over the pairs across samples, here the reported percentages are for the full data set of the three countries. The percentages conrm that the majority of participants choosing A in Q1, also chose A in Q4 and Q7.
In particular, the proportions of answers of category (A,A) are 53.8% and 54.1% in (Q1,Q4) and (Q1,Q7), respectively; moreover, the percentages for the other categories do not show any tendency to switch from A to B (or to indierence) between Q1 and Q4 and Q7. Table 4 show that in all three countries the majority of subjects do indeed value equality (they prefer A). Moreover, the dierences in proportion between preferences for A and for B are highly signicant (d -test) and the patterns are homogeneous across the three countries (χ 2 -test).
4 Does mobility preference reduce support for equality? A person with the substitution view should switch preferences from A to B going from Q8 (zero mobility) to Q5 (partial mobility) and to Q2 (perfect mobility, where the B response should be strictly preferred). So the large proportion of A preferences for all three questions in Table 4 suggests that a majority 20 In general, previous questionnaires conducted to investigate people's attitude towards income inequality took the form of a test of the classical Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (Amiel and Cowell 1992; Amiel and Cowell 1998 , Harrison and Seidl 1994 , Bernasconi 2002 , Traub and Schmidt 2009 . Support for the principle depends on the range of the income distribution in which income transfers occur, on the type of verbal or numerical test conducted, on the frames adopted to test it (e.g. whether from a external observer viewpoint, under a condition similar to the veil of ignorance, or under one of individual risk) Amiel (1999) , Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) . and to Q2 in all the three samples. The dierence-of-proportions test reveals some low signicance only in the aggregate data for the dierence between Q8
and Q2 (with the proportions of B answers increasing from 11.2% to 16.0%, d = 1.625, one-tailed p < 10%), but not between Q8 and Q5, nor between Q5 and Q2. Table 5 shows the joint distributions of choices over (Q2,Q5), (Q2,Q8) and (Q5,Q8) which strengthen the evidence that the majority of subjects chose (A,A) over all the three pairs of questions, but conrm the moderate tendency of switching preferences from A to B in going from Q8 to Q2 and Q5. 21 The substitution view is rejected by the majority, but may hold for a small minority of respondents.
21 This can be veried comparing the proportions of answers of type (B,A) in (Q2,Q8) and (Q5,Q8), with those of type (A,B) which are consistent with an opposite tendency.
While the proportions of the latter patterns are very small, the former are larger, with dierences that are statistically signicant. In particular, in (Q2,Q8) the proportion of answers (B,A) is 8.5% (30/355) and those of type (A,B) is 3.7% (13/355) (d = 2.76, onetailed p < 1%); in (Q5,Q8) the answers (B,A) are 5.9% (21/355) and those of type (A,B) is 2.3% (8/355) (d = 2.6, one-tailed p < 1%). Instead, there is no signicance dierence in the frequencies of (A,B) and (B,A) answers in (Q2,Q5). 5 Are people willing to sacrice some equality for more mobility? The acceptance of an equality-mobility trade-o may arise when some inequality is necessary for greater mobility, as in a meritocracy. The answers to Q3 (Rigidity v Mixing+Widening), Q6 (Rigidity v Partial Mixing+Widening), and Q8 (Rigidity v Simple widening) provide evidence here.
The results are consistent with the trade-o if response B in Q3 is chosen more often than in Q6, which in turn is chosen more often than in Q8. 22 The evidence in Table 6 The trade-o evidence is supported by the joint distributions over (Q3,Q6), (Q3,Q8) and (Q6,Q8) in Table 7 : while in all the three pairs the relative majorities of choices are for (A,A), there are also a substantial proportion of (B,A) responses. 24 Moreover, in (Q3,Q6) more than a quarter of the respon-22 An alternative hypothesis here is that people do not switch preferences between the three questions, and in particular that they choose in Q3 and Q6 the same scenario A as in Q8. For example, a prediction of no trade-o would hold either for individuals who do not care about mobility, or for those who consider the greater inequality of scenario B in the three questions anyhow too high to be compensated for any amount of mobility (even when mobility is perfect as in B of Q3). 76.7% 11.2% 11.8% 13.11 * * * dents choose (B,B), the scenarios with more mobility.
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The role of personal factors
It is potentially interesting to know the personal traits that appear to predispose respondents to certain choices. Table 8 reports the actual personal information from the end of the questionnaire. In general we do not observe large dierences in the average answers across the three country subsamples.
One important dierence is that, while all students in Israel and the majority in Italy are from their respective country, most students in UK are from abroad (A3). In all countries, most respondents perceive that their family income is high (F1) and just above the country average (F2) and the majority believe that they will improve their parents' economic (P1) and social positions (P2 We constructed two individual preference indices: for any respondent mobility preference is the number of A responses on Q1, Q4 and Q7; for any respondent equality preference is the number of A responses on Q2, Q5 and Q8. Table 9 shows the distributions of the variables across the four possible categories of response and conrms that the majority of respondents value both mobility and equality: for both variables, there are very few 0A; for mobility preference category 3A is the most favoured (although there are dierences in pattern across the subsamples); equality preference category 3A commands an absolute majority in all the three subsamples. Table 5 presents the results of three specications of an ordered probit regressions for each of the two preference variables with the personal factors of Table 9 as independent variables.
In the baseline mobility-preference regression only V1 (independence of parents and children's income in society) is signicant: as one would expect, those who agree that independence is desirable value mobility higher; but we do not see any eect on mobility preference from the role of independence as equality of opportunities (V2) nor of the view regarding whether the government should provide equality of opportunities or reduce income differences (V3). In the baseline equality-preference regression family income has a positive eect, which may be consistent with an altruistic attitude of those perceiving themselves as better-o. Also, participants perceiving better prospects of moving upwards in the social parade are less inclined to value income equality higher than those who perceive to have lower prospects (P2). This result may be consistent with arguments sometimes used in the political economic literature to explain why the poor do not always support (1 strongly agree with a.; 10 strongly agree with b.) real world redistributive policy if they perceive that they can be in a better economic position in the future (Benabou and Ok 2001) , but there may also be some deeper factors weakening preferences for income equality, independent of material interest. 25 The regression also shows that participants who value equality higher seem those who agree that government should care to equality of opportunities more than to equality of income (V3). The eect is small, but opposite to that expected by the substitution view.
The second regression uses country dummies (Israel is the base case).
The results for mobility preference show a negative impact of the dummy 25 Supporting this interpretation note the negative eect of prospect on social position (P2) rather than the prospect on income (P1), which also has a negative eect. Removing P2 from the regression makes P1 not signicant. Also note that all respondents are students, who in Italy and Israel are mainly from their respective country, whereas in UK are mainly from abroad (Table   8 ).
The third regression includes a nationality dummy. This is constructed from the response to question 3 (Do you consider yourself ...? + multiple nationality categories); in eect it is coded as though the question were do you consider yourself from round here? taking value 1 (Yes) or 0 (No). This is negative and highly signicant for the mobility-preference regression but not for the equality-preference regression. Those who have literally moved from overseas to study are more likely to be in favour of mobility; but they are no more likely to be in favour of equality than their peers.
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Concluding remarks Do people value mobility? Clearly, yes. Is mobility enough? Clearly, no.
According to our respondents, if there is greater mobility in society then that is a good thing; but it does not meant that you can forget about equality (Table 5 ). The evidence shows that the majority of our respondents value positively both mobility and equality: not only do they reject the extreme position that treats income equality as the only mandatory welfare objective, Legend: Standard errors in brackets. Stars * , * * , * * * , denote rejection at, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
they also reject the position that considers income mobility as a primary social goal with income equality representing only a concern when the rst objective cannot be fully achieved.
Why do people value mobility? When mobility is accompanied by income growth then they are prepared to sacrice equality: this is evident from Table 6 . Respondents express willingness to sacrice some income equality to obtain more income mobility (or vice-versa) only when this is necessary, but not otherwise. So there is no direct trade-o in preferences between income mobility and income equality, but only an indirect trade-o involving eciency.
We found no evidence of personal factors that have both a positive effect in the evaluation of mobility and a negative eect on the evaluation of income equality (or vice-versa). Family income aects preferences for equality positively, while a prospect of social improvement aect them negatively.
Mobility is valued highly by those participants who have experienced it those who have moved to attend their course of study. There is some evidence of cross country dierences in the evaluation of mobility: respondents in Italy value it the least; those in the UK value it the most.
Investigating values concerning intergenerational mobility presents a challenge because of the multidimensional nature of mobility and because individuals' responses in real-world contexts may be motivated by personal interest.
The questionnaire approach to elicitation allows one to make the inequalitymobility tradeo precise through a series of linked pair-wise comparisons.
Further development of this approach on a larger scale may throw light on the important policy questions of how far income mobility is good for society and how far income inequality may be accepted in society when this is necessary to have more mobility.
